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ABSTRACT
Young children learning English are biased to attend to the shape of
solid rigid objects when learning novel names. This study seeks further
understanding of the processes that support this behavior by examining
a previous finding that three-year-old children are also biased to
generalize novel names for objects made from deformable materials by
shape, even after the materials are made salient. In two experiments,
we examined the noun generalizations of 72 two-, three- and four-
year-old children with rigid and deformable stimuli. Data reveal that
three-year-old, but not two- or four-year-old, children generalize
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names for deformable things by shape, and that this behavior is not
due to the syntactic context of the task. We suggest this behavior is
an overgeneralization of three-year-old children’s knowledge of how
rigid things are named and discuss the implications of this finding for a
developmental account of the origins of the shape bias.
A young child shown a novel solid object and told a novel name (e.g. ‘this is
a dax’) will most likely say that only other objects that share the same shape
as the exemplar can be called by the same name as the exemplar. Thus,
young children are said to show a ‘shape bias’ when generalizing novel
names for solid objects (Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988). This bias has been
demonstrated in numerous laboratories with both novel three-dimensional
objects (Booth, Waxman & Huang, 2005; Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003;
Graham & Poulin-Dubois, 1999; Hupp, 2004; Jones, Smith & Landau,
1991; Samuelson & Horst, 2007; Smith, Jones & Landau, 1992) and
pictures of familiar objects (Imai, Gentner & Uchida, 1994), and has been
documented in children’s spontaneous naming of novel things (Samuelson
& Smith, 2005). Cross-linguistic data suggest that children learning Spanish
and Japanese also demonstrate this bias, and that its developmental course
and the context cues that elicit attention to shape are tuned to the specifics
of the language being learned (Colunga & Smith, 2005; Gathercole & Min,
1997; Gathercole, Thomas & Evans, 2000; Imai & Mazuka, 2007; Smith &
Samuelson, 2006; Yoshida & Smith, 2003).
There is some debate in the literature concerning the nature and origin of
the shape bias (see Samuelson & Bloom-P. in press). Nevertheless, studies
suggest that children’s biased attention to shape in noun generalization tasks
emerges over the course of early vocabulary development (Gershkoff-Stowe
& Smith, 2004; Samuelson & Smith, 1999), and that development of the
shape bias aids early noun learning. In particular, children who learn to
attend to shape when naming novel objects subsequently show accelerated
vocabulary development (Samuelson, 2002; Smith, Jones, Landau,
Gershkoff-Stowe & Samuelson, 2002). Finally, recent studies suggest that
the shape bias is not as strong in children with language delays, and that
lessened attention to shape may serve as a pointer to a potentially significant
developmental disorder (Jones, 2003; Jones & Smith, 2005; Rescorla,
Roberts & Dahlsgaard, 1997; Thal & Katich, 1996).
Thus, it is clear that the shape bias children demonstrate in laboratory
novel noun generalization tasks is an important strand in the processes that
support early noun learning. Yet, shape is certainly not the only object
feature to which children attend when learning new names (Bloom-L. 1973;
Bowerman, 1978), and a bias to attend to shape, may only be useful for
SOME of the nouns children acquire early. The shape bias is a useful
word-learning strategy for nouns such as table, hammer and key that,
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according to adult judgments, name solid objects in shape-based categories
(Samuelson & Smith, 1999). It is not as clear that attending to shape when
learning nouns that name deformable1 things such as paper, blankets and
towels would be helpful, however. While it is true that some deformable
things have characteristic shapes, according to adult judgments many
deformable things are organized into categories based on similarity of
material (Samuelson & Smith, 1999, 2000). Further, material substance is
often critical to what can be done with these things. For example, while
both blankets and towels are likely to have a rectangular shape, it is their
particular material composition that distinguishes one from the other and
that influences what we do with each.
In a recent study, Samuelson & Smith (2000) examined how three-
year-old children categorize and name deformable stimuli. In their first
experiment, Samuelson & Smith (2000) tested three-year-old children’s
understanding of the importance of material substance for what can be done
with deformable stimuli. Children were asked to generalize properties from
rigid and deformable exemplars to test objects that matched the exemplars
in shape, color or material. The properties children were asked to generalize
were either related to the shape of rigid exemplars or to the material of
deformable exemplars, or they were unrelated to the shapes and materials
of the exemplars. Samuelson & Smith (2000) found that the rigidity of the
exemplar influenced children’s categorizations: three-year-old children
generalized properties to other objects of the same shape when exemplars
were rigid but to other objects made from the same material when
exemplars were deformable. When children were asked to generalize names
from these same exemplars, however, they did so by shape, saying that only
test objects that matched both rigid and deformable exemplars in shape
could be called by the same name. In a final critical experiment, Samuelson
a& Smith pitted the salient properties demonstrated in Experiment 1
against the naming bias demonstrated in Experiment 2. When demon-
strations of the properties used in the initial experiment were added to
[1] Because entities fall along a continuum from solid and rigid, to deformable, to non-solid,
our use of the terms ‘rigid’ and ‘deformable’ is based on judgments of object categories
collected by Samuelson & Smith (2000). Specifically, in Experiment 4 Samuelson &
Smith classified 148 concrete natural kind and artifact nouns commonly known by
two-and-a-half-year-old children as naming rigid, deformable, malleable or transient
entities based on the responses of adults to three questions : (1) Does the shape of the
entity change when pressure is applied? (2) Does the shape remain when pressure is
removed? and (3) Does the entity take the shape of a container? If the answer to all three
questions was ‘no’, the named entity was classified as rigid. If the answer to question 1
was ‘yes’ but the answers to questions 2 and 3 were ‘no’, the named entity was classified
as deformable. If the answers to questions 1 and 2 were ‘yes’ but the answer to question
3 was ‘no’, the entity was classified as malleable. Finally, if the answer to question 3 was
‘yes’, the entity was classified as malleable (regardless of the answer to the other two
questions). Please see Samuelson & Smith (2000) for further details.
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the name generalization task, three-year-old children again generalized
names by similarity in shape. These results indicate that three-year-old
children understand the importance of material substance for categorizing
deformable things in non-naming tasks, yet name these SAME OBJECTS by
similarity in shape – even after seeing a demonstration that highlighted the
object’s material.
Why did the three-year-old children in Samuelson & Smith’s (2000)
study generalize novel names for deformable stimuli by similarity in shape?
In the current study, we investigated this question in order to understand
the mechanisms that support the shape bias, thereby moving closer to
understanding the processes that support young children’s fast and efficient
noun learning. One of the primary questions in the current word learning
literature is how children’s previous knowledge – of object kinds, nominal
categories, lexical categories, functional categories and so on – is brought to
bear in individual moments of naming. Samuelson & Smith’s (2000) results
clearly demonstrate that children of the same age switch their categorization
responses when presented with the same stimuli and demonstrations,
simply due to a change in the task context. This then provides an opportunity
to examine how children apply knowledge in specific task contexts. For
instance, is the shape bias children demonstrate a default response to a
naming task, or is it due to the perceptual similarity of the test items,
associations between knowledge and cues present in the task, or perhaps the
application of a previously learned rule? Deformable stimuli provide a
particularly interesting test case because material is important to what
can be done with deformable things, yet deformable things often have
characteristic shapes. The present study provides a critical first step towards
addressing these issues of mechanism and the origins of the shape bias by
probing the factors that cause children to sometimes categorize deformable
stimuli by shape and other times by material.
Three possible explanations
Samuelson & Smith (2000) suggested three possible reasons children in
their study overlooked the material substance of the deformable exemplars
and instead formed nominal categories organized by shape. The first possi-
bility was that the push to attend to material provided by the property
demonstration was too weak to override the strong attentional pull created
by the naming task. This possibility is based on the idea that children’s
performance in different kinds of categorization tasks differs based on the
purpose of the task (e.g. Barsalou, 1983; Smith & Samuelson, 1997). In
Samuelson & Smith’s first two experiments, children categorized deformable
things by material when making inferences about what the objects could
do (Experiment 1) but by shape when naming them (Experiment 2).
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When these two competing purposes were combined in the name-plus-
demonstration task of Experiment 3, the fact that children were ultimately
asked to generalize a name may have overridden the demonstration, and
pushed children to form categories organized by shape. The tendency to
disregard material and form nominal categories organized by shape may be
especially potent for deformable stimuli because, while deformable things
can change shape, they have typical shapes to which they return after
transformations. Given that the properties used to highlight the materials
of the exemplars were not exclusive to the objects’ particular material
(things besides sponge can squish to fit into a cup), it is possible that the
demonstrations were not linked closely enough to the material substance of
the objects to override naming by shape. This idea fits with recent data from
tasks that pit shape against function and suggest children may default to
naming objects by shape rather than function when the functions are not
clearly linked to object features (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003; Gathercole &
Whitfield, 2001; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000).
This explanation suggests two possible developmental courses for
children’s tendency to attend to shape when generalizing names for
deformable things. On one hand, it could be that people generally, not just
three-year-old children, generalize properties based on features related to
what can be done with an object but name objects by shape (especially
when the properties to be generalized and the features are not tightly
linked). In this case, we would expect all children, not just three-year-olds,
to attend to shape when generalizing names for these deformable objects
when presented with the same task, stimuli and properties (for a similar
suggestion see Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003). On the other hand, it could
be that as children get older and gain experience with objects, names and
the link between what an object looks like and what can be done with it,
they learn that features other than shape are often important for naming.
In this case, we would expect children older than three to be less likely
to attend to shape when naming deformables.
A second possible reason why the three-year-old children in Samuelson
& Smith’s (2000) study generalized novel names for deformables according
to similarity in shape may be that the task did not tap into their knowledge
of deformable things. Because young children learn many names for
categories organized by shape (Samuelson & Smith, 1999), the context of a
naming event and, in particular, the count noun syntactic context ‘This
is a ____’ is repeatedly associated with attention to shape. Smith and
colleagues have suggested that this repeated association creates an automatic
pull on attention such that any time children are placed in a similar naming
context, the surface similarities of the naming event capture attention
and direct it to shape (Landau et al., 1988; Smith, 2000; Smith, Jones &
Landau, 1996). By this view, children’s attention will be biased towards
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shape when generalizing a novel name in a naming task with a count
noun syntactic context even when the named objects are non-rigid and
deformable.
The data on young children’s novel noun generalizations further
suggest that attention to shape in the context of count noun syntax grows
stronger and is more closely tied to the syntactic context over development
(see Smith, 2000, for a review). This suggests that there should be a
developmental trend in children’s attention to shape with deformables when
a count noun syntactic frame is used. Children younger than three should
be less likely to attend to shape when generalizing novel names because they
have had less exposure to the pairing of count noun syntax and attention to
shape. By the time children are three years of age, the count noun syntactic
context of a naming event has been associated with attention to shape
repeatedly, causing them to attend to shape when learning new count nouns
even when deformable stimuli are used and the material substance of the
stimuli is highlighted. Further, children older than three should also attend
to shape in this context, and perhaps do so at even higher levels, because
they have had even more exposure to pairings of attention to shape
and count noun syntax. This proposal also suggests that three-year-old
children’s attention to shape with deformables would be reduced by
changing the syntax used in the task from a count noun syntactic frame
(‘This is a dax. Is this a dax?’) to a mass noun syntactic frame (‘This is
some dax. Is this some dax?’), for example.
The third possibility suggested by Samuelson & Smith (2000) was that
attention to shape when naming deformable stimuli is specific to three-year-
old children. In particular, Samuelson & Smith suggested that children’s
attention to shape when naming novel deformable stimuli was based on the
way the categories of deformable things with which three-year-old children
are familiar are named. Samuelson & Smith (2000) analyzed a corpus of
object and substance terms that children typically learn by two-and-a-half
years of age, and thus were likely to be known by the three-year-old
children in their study. They found that this segment of the early noun
vocabulary is dominated by count nouns that name rigid objects in
categories well organized by similarity in shape. In addition, most of the
names for deformable things young children learn early are count nouns
(e.g. a napkin, a towel). Thus, the deformable things that young children
know how to name are like rigid things in that they are both solid and both
named by count nouns. Samuelson & Smith proposed that three-year-old
children’s attention to shape when naming novel deformable stimuli was
an overgeneralization based on the way rigid things are named in the
typical early noun vocabulary (Samuelson & Smith, 2000).
Samuelson & Smith thus suggested that if the behavior of the three-
year-old children in their study was an overgeneralization based on the
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strong tie between rigidity, attention to shape and naming that these
children have developed, then younger and older children, for whom this
tie is not as strong, should attend to shape less often when naming
deformable things. On one hand, younger children should be less likely to
attend to shape when generalizing names for deformable things because
they would not yet have as much exposure to the link between count noun
syntax, names for rigid objects and names for deformable things. On the
other hand, older children, who know more names of all kinds, and are thus
likely have a more precise representation of when syntax and category
structure correspond, will also be less likely to attend to shape when naming
of deformable stimuli.
The three explanations for why three-year-old children failed to attend to
material when naming deformable stimuli thus make different predictions
as to whether children younger and older than those tested by Samuelson &
Smith (2000) should attend to shape when naming deformable stimuli.
Specifically, the first possibility – that three-year-old children attended
to shape with deformable things because the naming task overrode the
property demonstrations – suggests that children should show either stable
or decreasing attention to shapewhen naming deformable things. If, however,
children younger than the three-year-olds tested by Samuelson & Smith
(2000) attend to material following the property demonstrations they used,
it would suggest that naming does not override property demonstrations
for some children. Thus, if younger children DO NOT generalize names for
deformable things by shape, it would work against the first possibility
suggested by Samuelson & Smith. The second possibility – that children’s
attention was automatically pulled to shape due to repeated association of
count noun syntax and attention to shape – suggests that attention to shape
when naming deformables should increase with age and be tied to the use
of a count noun syntactic frame. Thus, this possibility would be ruled out
if older children do not attend to shape when naming deformables or if
three-year-old children still attend to shape when a different syntactic
frame is used. The third possibility – that attention to shape when naming
deformables is a type of overgeneralization behavior unique to three-year-
old children – predicts a curvilinear trend. This possibility could be ruled
out in two ways: (1) if either younger or older children also demonstrate
a bias to attend to shape when naming deformable things; or (2) if both
younger and older children also demonstrate a bias to attend to shape when
naming deformable things.
The current study
To test the three possible explanations, we used Samuelson & Smith’s
procedure with children of different ages. Experiment 1 tested the three
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possible explanations by repeating Samuelson & Smith’s study with
two- and four-year-old children. We chose these ages because, on the one
hand, they were different enough from the three-year-old children
Samuelson & Smith studied to have different amounts of experience with
names, categories and syntax. On the other hand, pilot data suggested two-
year-old children were the youngest group for whom the yes/no procedure
would be possible, and four-year-old children were the oldest group that
would not be overly bored with the experiment. A group of three-year-old
children was also tested to replicate the basic effect. Experiment 2 provided
a further test of the second proposal by checking whether three-year-old
children’s attention to shape is due to the use of a count noun syntactic
frame. Specifically, a second group of three-year-old children was run in
the same task used in Experiment 1, but with mass noun syntax.
Note that testing these three proposals is only a first step toward under-
standing the mechanism underlying the performance of three-year-old
children in this task. For instance, finding support for the third proposal
in the current studies would lead to further questions about the
implementation of that process. Specifically, the idea that three-year-old
children overgeneralize the shape bias suggests that children’s tendency to
attend to shape when naming deformable things should be linked to the
structure of the early noun vocabulary. This could be tested directly by: (1)
collecting data on noun generalization and the specific words and categories
known from a group of children around three years of age; (2) analyzing the
structure of their vocabularies in terms of the numbers of names for rigid
and deformable things, count and mass nouns, and the organization of the
categories named by the nouns individual children know; and (3) examining
the relationship between the specifics of vocabulary structure and patterns
of noun generalization. However, because the vocabulary measure used
previously to establish the similarity structure of the early noun vocabulary,
the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory (Fenson,
Dale, Reznick, Bates, Thal & Pethick, 1994), is not valid for three-year-old
children, this would require the development of a valid measure of all the
names for rigid and deformable things in a three-year-old child’s vocabulary
and collection of adult ratings of the similarity structure of all of those
nominal categories. Before engaging in this intensive undertaking, the
present study asks the logically prior question given Samuelson & Smith’s
proposal – was the failure to attend to material when naming the deformable
stimuli really specific to three-year-old children?
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of this experiment was to examine whether two- and
four-year-old children generalize novel names for deformable things by
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shape similarity like the three-year-old children tested by Samuelson &
Smith (2000).We used the same rigid and deformable stimuli used previously
and, like Samuelson & Smith, asked children to generalize the novel names
following property demonstrations that either highlighted the shape or
material of the named exemplar or were neutral. A group of three-year-old
children also participated to replicate Samuelson & Smith’s original finding.
The novel noun generalization procedure was used both to replicate the
protocol used by Samuelson & Smith (2000), and because the basic
task – pointing to objects and asking children to name them – is similar to
word-learning behaviors parents and children engage in at home (see, for
example, Rogoff, Mistry, Goncu & Moiser, 1993). Further, performance in
this task has been shown to relate to word learning outside of the laboratory
(Gershkoff-Stowe & Smith, 2004; Samuelson, 2002; Samuelson & Smith,
1999; Smith et al., 2002). To ensure that our procedure matched that of
Samuelson & Smith (2000), we used their conservative criteria for under-
standing the task for inclusion in our sample. These criteria are also useful
because we expected the yes/no procedure to be difficult for the youngest
children, and they help ensure that the children who were included in
the sample understood the task. However, we also conducted follow-up
analyses on the included and excluded two-year-old children to determine
whether the results were specific to two-year-old children who passed
the conservative inclusion criteria or typical of two-year-old children in
general.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-eight children, 16 two-year-olds (range=1;11.25 to 2;3.5, M=
2;1.19), 16 three-year-olds (range 3;0.20 to 3;2.28, M=3;1.12) and 16
four-year-olds (range=4;0.5 to 4;3.18, M=4;0.27) were recruited from
county birth records through a database at the university. All children
were developing normally and were from middle-class, English-speaking
families. There were 8 males and 8 females in the two-year-old group,
10 males and 6 females in the three-year-old group, and 10 males and
6 females in the four-year-old group. Informed consent was obtained from
the children’s parent or guardian prior to the experimental session. Each
child received a small gift for participating.
In addition to these children, 11 two-year-old children and 1 three-
year-old child were tested, but their data were excluded from analysis
because they did not finish the task (4 two-year-old children and 1
three-year-old child), because they did not respond on two or more trials
(6 two-year-old children) or due to experimenter error (1 two-year-old
child). Finally, to ensure that children who contributed data understood
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the task, we followed Samuelson & Smith’s (2000) conservative inclusion
criteria (see below). We excluded data from an additional 9 two-year-old
children and 1 three-year-old child for failure to meet this standard.
However, because of the high attrition rate in the two-year-old age
group, additional analyses relaxing some of these criteria are included in
the Appendix. These analyses confirm that the obtained results are not
unique to the subset of two-year-old children who passed all inclusion
criteria.
Stimuli
The training stimuli consisted of familiar objects. The exemplar was a
purple plastic egg. The test objects included an egg identical to the
exemplar and several other objects that differed from the exemplar in all
respects : a red wooden block, a plastic flower, a plastic teapot, a small
basket, a rubber duck, a multicolored miniature slinky and a small stuffed
dinosaur. All of the objects were similar in size.
The experimental stimuli consisted of four sets of novel objects (see
Figure 1). Each set consisted of an exemplar and six test objects. The
exemplars for Sets 1 and 2 were made from rigid materials, and the
exemplars for Sets 3 and 4 were made from non-rigid, deformable materials.
The exemplar for Set 1 was a 14.0 cmr3.8 cm barbell-shaped piece of
wood painted green with a bumpy texture; the exemplar for Set 2 was an
8.3 cm in diameter blue clay ball with four clay pegs; the exemplar for Set 3
was a 14.0 cm tallr5.7 cm wide piece of yellow sponge cut into a rounded
‘V’ shape; and the exemplar for Set 4 was an 11.4 cmr9.5 cm pink
polygon-shaped plastic bean bag.
For each exemplar two different kinds of properties could be demonstrated.
One kind of property was designed to highlight the shape of rigid exemplars
or the material of deformable exemplars. These properties are referred to
as ‘related’ properties because they were based on the shape of the rigid
exemplars and the material of the deformable exemplars. The other kind of
property was not based on the shape, color or material of the exemplar.
Thus, these are referred to as ‘arbitrary’ properties. These properties are
not expected to direct children’s attention to any particular feature of
the exemplar. For Set 1, the related property was rolling, and for Set 2,
the related property was fitting into a puzzle (see Figure 1). For Set 3, the
related property was squishing into a cup, and for Set 4, the related
property was folding. Because each individual child only saw two arbitrary
properties and because these properties were not based on any feature of the
exemplars, the same two arbitrary properties, having a small design on it
that glowed in the dark or having a sticker on the back, were used for all
four sets.
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For each set, two of the test objects matched the exemplar in shape
but were a different color and were made from a different material ; two
matched the exemplar in color but were different in shape and made from
different materials ; and two matched the exemplar in material but were
different in shape and color. The stimuli were identical to those used by
Stimulus set
Related property
Exemplar
Name
Set 1 Set 4
 Same 
shape
Same
material
Same
color
rolls
Rel Gaz
green
bumpy wood
  pink 
sponge
purple
Styrofoam
green cloth
bean bag
green
Styrofoam
      blue 
bumpy wood
    yellow 
bumpy wood
pink plastic 
bean bag
cream plastic 
   bean bag
blue plastic 
  bean bag
pink 
sponge
yellow
sponge
dk green
clay
pink
wood
folds
Set 3
fits in puzzle
purple 
  clay
red 
clay
blue clay
lt. blue
Styrofoam
lt. blue plastic
bean bag
yellow wax
green
sponge
Hux
 Set 2
squishes
 blue  
sponge
Kiv
 pink  
sponge
yellow
sponge
dk red pillow
green mesh-
covered wood
  yellow cloth 
bean bag
yellow
Styrofoam
Fig. 1. Stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2.
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Samuelson & Smith (2000) with the exceptions that one of the color
matches in Set 4 was replaced because the original had broken and one of
the shape matches for Set 2 that was made of wood was replaced by a cloth
pillow. This second change was made so that one of the shape matches and
one of the color matches in each set was deformable. Although Samuelson
& Smith (2000) found that it was the rigidity of the exemplar, and not
the rigidity of the test objects, that influenced children’s categorizations,
we equated the rigidity of the test objects across sets, nonetheless.
Design
Each child saw all four sets of stimuli. Each child saw a related property
demonstrated for one of the rigid exemplars and an arbitrary property demon-
strated for the other.Likewise, each child saw a related property demonstrated
for one deformable exemplar and an arbitrary property for the other. Which
exemplars had related and arbitrary properties was counterbalanced across
children.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Samuelson & Smith (2000). The
experimenter sat across from the child at a table. The child’s parent sat
next to the child and was asked not to interfere with the experiment or
direct the child’s responses in any way.
The experiment began with training trials. These trials were included to
familiarize the child with the experimental setting and to make sure they
were comfortable saying both ‘yes’ (to the item identical to the exemplar)
and ‘no’ (to items that differed from the exemplar) in response to the
experimenter’s questions. Thus, the stimuli used on these trials were
objects familiar to two-year old children. On the first training trial the child
was introduced to a stuffed animal, told ‘Edward is a very picky bear. He
only likes things like this ’. Then the experimenter showed the child the
egg exemplar and said ‘This is an egg, and you know what? It opens’, and
opened and closed the egg. The experimenter set the egg by Edward and
told the child they were going to find more eggs for him. Before presenting
each test object, the experimenter reminded the child that the egg opens.
The experimenter then brought out a test object, and asked ‘Is this an
egg?’. On each training trial, the experimenter praised the child for each
correct response and provided corrections for incorrect responses. Each
child was presented with up to eight randomly ordered training trials,
which included at least two presentations of the identical egg. We used the
same conservative criteria used by Samuelson & Smith (2000) to ensure
that children understood the task. Specifically, we required that children
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correctly answer four consecutive training trials in order to be included in
the analysis. Data from five two-year-old children and one three-year-old
child were excluded for failure to meet this criterion.
The experimental trials proceeded in the same manner as the training
trials with the exception that the experimenter did not praise or correct
the child during these trials. The experimenter introduced the child to a
stuffed animal, told the child the animal only ‘wants things like this ’,
named the exemplar and demonstrated the property for the child before
placing the exemplar by the animal. Then the experimenter presented each
test object one at a time. Again, before presenting each test object, the
experimenter reminded the child of the exemplar’s property. For example,
the experimenter would say, ‘Remember, this is a rel and it rolls ’, and then
present a test object and ask, ‘Is this a rel?’. Note that we, like Samuelson
& Smith (2000), did not demonstrate the properties with the test objects
because we were interested in the effect of the exemplar demonstration
on children’s responses to the test objects. Further, in their property
generalization task Samuelson & Smith (2000) found that children were
capable of generalizing the properties demonstrated with the exemplar
without the properties being demonstrated with the test objects.
After all six test objects for a set were presented, the experimenter moved
on to the next set. Between sets, the two- and three-year-old children were
allowed to choose a sticker to take home. This measure helped the younger
children remain engaged in the task. Like Samuelson & Smith (2000),
we required that children say ‘no’ to at least one test object during the
experimental trials as an additional check that they understood the task.
Data from four two-year-old children were excluded for not meeting
this criterion. The order of the exemplars and the test objects was randomly
determined and counterbalanced across children. Children’s yes/no responses
were recorded on a datasheet by the experimenter during the experiment.
RESULTS
Figure 2 shows the mean proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that
matched the exemplar in shape, color or material for demonstrations of
related and arbitrary properties at each age (data are graphed as proportions
to correspond to data from Samuelson & Smith (2000) but no trials were
omitted from any analysis so proportions correspond to frequencies). These
data were analyzed in a rigidity (2)rtest object (3)rrelatedness (2)rage (3)
repeated measures ANOVA with age as the only between-subjects factor.
This analysis yielded main effects of age (F(2, 45)=3.50, p=0.04, g2=
0.135), and test object (F(2, 90)=105.09, p<0.001, g2=0.700), and test
objectrage and rigidityrtest object interactions (F(4, 90)=2.95, p=0.02,
g2=0.116) and (F(2, 90)=19.55, p<0.001, g2=0.303), respectively. These
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Fig. 2. Results of Experiment 1. Proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched
the exemplar on shape, color or material for deformable and rigid exemplars following de-
monstrations of related or arbitrary properties for two-, three- and four-year-old children.
Bars represent standard errors. Proportions of ‘yes’ responses significantly different from
chance levels (0.50, dashed line) are indicated by an *. Lines indicate cells collapsed for
analyses against chance (see text). Count noun syntax was used to introduce the names in this
experiment.
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were subsumed by a significant relatednessrrigidityrtest objectrage
interaction (F(4, 90)=3.17, p=0.02, g2=0.124). Because the two main
questions asked in this experiment were (1) whether the previously seen
tendency of three-year-old children to generalize names for deformable
stimuli by shape was replicated and (2) whether younger and older children
also showed this bias, the data were further analyzed using tests of
simple effects at each age. Specific direct age comparisons are presented in
a subsequent analysis.
Simple-effects and t tests – three-year-old children
Recall that Samuelson & Smith (2000) found that three-year-old children’s
proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched the exemplar in
shape was higher than the proportion of ‘yes’ responses for test objects that
matched the exemplar in color or material, regardless of whether the
exemplar was rigid or deformable. The data depicted in the middle panel
of Figure 2 replicate this finding. Tests of simple effects on the data
from three-year-old children that included the rigidity, test object and
relatedness factors, revealed a significant main effect of test object
(F(2, 30)=86.90, p<0.001, g2=0.853) and a significant rigidityrtest object
interaction (F(2, 30)=12.69, p=0.0001, g2=0.458) for this age group. The
main effect of relatedness was not significant and there were no significant
interactions involving this factor. Thus, we collapsed across this factor
and conducted further tests of simple effects split on rigidity. These tests
revealed significant effects of test object both when the exemplar was rigid
and when it was deformable (rigid: F(2, 30)=90.37, p<0.001, g2=0.858;
deformable: F(2, 30)=38.91, p<0.001, g2=0.722). Tukey’s HSD tests
(/<0.05) on the data from the sets with rigid exemplars revealed that
the proportion of ‘yes’ responses was significantly higher for test objects
that matched the exemplar in shape, compared to material or color. The
proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched the exemplar in
color and material did not differ. For the sets with deformable exemplars,
Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that the proportion of ‘yes’ responses to
shape-matching test objects was higher than the proportion for material-
matching test objects which was in turn higher than the proportion for
color-matching test objects. Thus, three-year-old children generalized
novel names for both rigid and deformable exemplars to test objects that
matched those exemplars in shape more often than to test objects that
matched in material.
Tests of simple effects on data from three-year-old children indicate
that these children generalized names for the deformable stimuli by shape.
Note, however, that these tests only confirm that children said ‘yes’ to
shape-matching test objects more than material-matching ones. Another
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important question is whether children said ‘yes’ to shape-matching test
objects at levels greater than what would be expected by chance. To
examine this issue, we compared three-year-old children’s proportion of
‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched the exemplar in shape to
0.50. We collapsed across relatedness in this analysis because the previous
analyses revealed no main effects or interactions involving this factor at
this age. T tests revealed that three-year-old children said ‘yes’ to test
objects that matched the exemplar in shape at levels significantly different
from those expected by chance both when the exemplar was rigid (t(15)=
9.49, p<0.001) and when it was deformable (t(15)=2.93, p=0.01). Thus,
three-year-old children showed strong and systematic attention to shape
with both rigid and deformable exemplars.
Simple-effects and t tests – two-year-old children
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 2, two-year-old children’s
response pattern was different. Two-year-old children had a high
proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched the exemplar in
shape, but with some stimulus sets they had an equally high proportion of
‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched the exemplar in material. Tests
of simple effects on the data from two-year-old children that included the
rigidity, test object and relatedness factors revealed a significant main
effect of test object (F(2, 30)=15.51, p<0.001, g2=0.508) and a significant
rigidity by test object interaction (F(2, 30)=3.55, p=0.04, g2=0.191).
There were no significant effects of relatedness. Thus, we collapsed across
this factor and conducted further tests of simple effects split on rigidity.
These tests revealed significant effects of test object both when the exemplar
was rigid and when it was deformable (rigid: F(2, 30)=15.69, p<0.001,
g2=0.304; deformable: F(2, 30)=6.54, p=0.004, g2=0.511). Tukey’s HSD
tests on data from the sets with rigid exemplars revealed that the proportion
of ‘yes’ responses was significantly higher for test objects that matched the
exemplar in shape compared to material or color. In contrast, Tukey’s HSD
tests on data from sets with deformable exemplars revealed a significant
difference in responding to the shape- and color-matching test objects,
but no differences in responding to the shape- and material-matching or
material- and color-matching test objects.
As with data from three-year-olds, we compared two-year-old children’s
proportion of ‘yes’ responses to chance levels, collapsing across relatedness.
Two-year-old children said ‘yes’ to test objects that matched the exemplar
in shape at levels significantly different from chance when the exemplar
was rigid (t(15)=4.14, p<0.001) but not when it was deformable (t(15)=
1.16, n.s.). Consistent with the analyses above, these results suggest that
two-year-old children showed a bias to generalize novel names by shape,
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but only with rigid stimuli – this bias did not extend to the naming of
deformable stimuli.
Simple-effects and t tests – four-year-old children
Data from the four-year-old children can be seen in the bottom panel of
Figure 2. As is clear in the figure, four-year-old children were more selective
in their responding – they did not say ‘yes’ as often as children from the
other two age groups. In fact, the only case in which they showed a
high proportion of ‘yes’ responses was to test objects that matched rigid
exemplars in shape following demonstrations of properties related to the
shape of those exemplars. Tests of simple effects that included the rigidity,
test object and relatedness factors on the data from four-year-old children
revealed significant main effects of rigidity (F(1, 15)=10.06, p=0.006,
g2=0.401) and test object (F(2, 30)=31.11, p<0.001, g2=0.675), a signifi-
cant rigidityrtest object interaction (F(2, 30)=7.39, p=0.003, g2=0.330)
and a significant relatednessrrigidityrtest object interaction (F(2, 30)=
3.57, p=0.04, g2=0.192). To examine this three-way interaction, we con-
ducted further analyses on the related and arbitrary properties separately.
For trials following a demonstration of a related property, tests of simple
effects that included the rigidity and test object factors revealed a significant
main effect of test object (F(2, 30)=29.22, p<0.001, g2=0.680) and a
significant rigidityrtest object interaction (F(2, 30)=8.34, p=0.001,
g2=0.497). Further tests of simple effects split on rigidity revealed significant
effects of test object both when the exemplar was rigid and when it was
deformable (rigid: F(2, 30)=59.70, p<0.001, g2=0.260; deformable:
F(2, 30)=5.27, p=0.01, g2=0.799). Tukey’s HSD tests on the data from
the sets with rigid exemplars revealed that the proportion of ‘yes’ responses
was significantly higher for test objects that matched the exemplar in shape
compared to those that matched in material or color. The proportion
of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched the exemplar in color
and material did not differ. For the sets with deformable exemplars,
however, Tukey’s HSD tests revealed no difference in responding to the
shape- and material-matching test objects. There was a significant difference
in responding to shape- and color-matching test objects, but no difference
in responding to the material- and color-matching test objects.
T tests comparing responses on trials following demonstrations of related
properties to chance indicated that the proportion of ‘yes’ responses to
test objects that matched rigid exemplars in shape was significantly higher
than would be expected by chance (t(15)=3.48, p=0.003), but the
proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched deformable
exemplars in shape was not significantly different from chance (t(15)=
0.49, n.s.). Overall then, for trials following demonstrations of related
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properties, four-year-old children systematically generalized novel names
by shape when the exemplar was rigid and a property related to shape was
demonstrated, but this bias did not carry over to the naming of deformable
stimuli.
For trials following a demonstration of an arbitrary property, tests of
simple effects that included the rigidity and test object factors revealed
a different pattern of significance. Specifically, there were significant
main effects of rigidity (F(2, 15)=5.45, p=0.03, g2=0.266) and test object
(F(2, 30)=15.90, p<0.001, g2=0.514), but no interaction. A paired t test
revealed that the overall proportion of ‘yes’ responses was higher when
the exemplar was rigid compared to deformable (t(15)=2.33, p=0.03).
Moreover, Tukey’s HSD tests revealed there was a higher proportion of
‘yes’ responses to shape-matching compared to color- or material-matching
test objects, but no differences in responding to color- and material-
matching test objects. Critically, t tests comparing responses to chance
levels indicated that four-year-old children’s proportion of ‘yes’ responses
to shape-matching test objects did not exceed levels expected by chance
when the exemplar was rigid (t(15)=1.43, n.s.) or when it was deformable
(t(15)=0.27, n.s.). Thus, when an arbitrary property was demonstrated,
four-year-old children did not systematically generalize names for rigid or
deformable exemplars by shape.
Direct age comparisons
Taken together, analyses of performance at each age suggest a curvilinear
trend in children’s generalizations of names for deformable stimuli follow-
ing demonstrations of related and arbitrary properties. Three-year-old
children generalized names for deformable stimuli by shape similarity even
after a demonstration that highlighted the material the exemplar was made
of, but two- and four-year-old children did not. In the previous analyses,
however, children’s performance was examined separately at each age.
This was needed to examine the details of children’s shape and material
responding for each set at each age, but it was limited by the absence of
direct age comparisons for the deformable sets. Thus, to investigate the
developmental changes more directly, a second set of analyses comparing
the performance of two- and three-year-old children and three- and
four-year-old children was conducted. As is clear in Figure 2, there were
large differences between age groups in children’s overall pattern of
responding –that is, the number of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses to the three
different kinds of test objects in a set. Because we wanted to directly
examine differences in this overall pattern of responding, we used ANOVAs
in these analyses. These analyses focused specifically on children’s
generalizations of names for deformable stimuli.
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The previous analyses of data from two- and three-year-old children
revealed no differences in name generalization following demonstrations
of related and arbitrary properties for either age group. Therefore, we
collapsed across this factor and performed an age (2)rtest object (3)
ANOVA on the proportion of ‘yes’ responses for the sets with
deformable stimuli. We only report significant age-related effects. This
analysis revealed an agertest object interaction (F(2, 60)=5.35, p=0.007,
g2=0.151). As discussed previously, two-year-old children were equally
likely to say ‘yes’ to test objects that matched the exemplar in shape
and material, but three-year-old children said ‘yes’ to test objects
that matched the exemplar in shape significantly more than those that
matched in material. Thus, the difference across these age groups revealed
in previous analyses was statistically robust in a direct age-related
comparison.
Because the previous analyses of data from four-year-old children
revealed a significant difference in responding following demonstrations
of related and arbitrary properties, we performed separate age (2)rtest
object (3) ANOVAs on the proportion of ‘yes’ responses for the sets
with deformable stimuli following demonstrations of related and arbitrary
properties. Analyses of responses following demonstrations of related
properties revealed a significant main effect of age (F(2, 30)=5.29, p=0.03,
g2=0.150). As can be seen in Figure 2, four-year-old children said ‘yes’ less
often, particularly to test objects that matched the exemplar in shape. Recall
that this brought their responding to shape to chance levels. Analyses of
responses following demonstrations of arbitrary properties revealed no
significant age-related effects. As can be seen in Figure 2, both three- and
four-year-olds responses were less systematic (i.e. closer to chance levels)
following the demonstration of an arbitrary property. Consequently,
although three-year-old children’s weaker bias to attend to shape in the
arbitrary property condition was strong enough to lead to above chance
responding in the analyses of three-year-olds’ data above, it was not strong
enough to produce age-related differences when compared to four-year-old
children’s responses. Importantly, however, there were robust age-related
differences between three- and four-year-olds when RELATED properties
were demonstrated: both three- and four-year-old children generalized
names for rigid exemplars by shape, but only three-year-old children
generalized names for deformable exemplars by shape following demon-
strations of a property related to material.
DISCUSSION
When presented with a novel deformable object and a novel name, three-
year-old children systematically generalized the novel name to other objects
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that were the same shape as the named object, even after a demonstration
designed to highlight the material substance of the exemplar. This finding
replicates Samuelson & Smith’s (2000) previous result. Importantly,
when two-year-old children were presented with the same stimuli and
demonstrations they did not generalize novel names in the same way as
three-year-old children. Two-year-old children were as likely to say ‘yes’ to
test objects that matched the exemplar in material as to those that matched
in shape when generalizing novel names for deformable objects. In contrast
to the two- and three-year-old children, four-year-old children’s general-
izations were clearly modulated by both the rigidity of the exemplar and the
kind of property demonstrated. When a property not specifically related to
the shape or material of the exemplar was demonstrated, four-year-old
children did not generalize novel names to many test objects, but when they
did say ‘yes’ it was most often to test objects that matched the exemplar in
shape, and more when the exemplar was rigid than when it was deformable.
In the context of a rigid object and a demonstration designed to highlight
the rigidity of the exemplar, four-year-old children generalized novel names
by shape similarity. Critically, however, in the context of a deformable
object and a demonstration that highlighted the material of the exemplar,
four-year-old children generalized novel names to the shape- and material-
matching test objects equally often.
Taken together then, the data suggest a curvilinear trend in children’s
tendency to attend to shape when naming deformable stimuli. In contrast
to three-year-old children, two-year-old children did not generalize names
for deformable stimuli by shape similarity. This suggests that the property
demonstrations were enough to pull attention away from shape with
deformable stimuli, for at least some children. Consequently, the data do
NOT fit with the idea that three-year-old children’s performance was due
to the inability of the property demonstrations to attract attention away
from shape. Four-year-old children also did not generalize novel names
for deformable stimuli by shape similarity. This finding suggests
three-year-old children’s performance was not due to an automatic pull to
attend to shape caused by the use of count noun syntax. Rather, the
developmental pattern fits best with Samuelson & Smith’s (2000) third
proposed explanation for three-year-old children’s performance – that this
pattern reflects a type of overgeneralization specific to three-year-old
children.
Recall that Samuelson & Smith suggested that the dominance of count
nouns that name solid objects in shape biased categories in the vocabulary
of a typical three-year-old child, along with the fact that many of the names
for deformable things that three-year-old children know are also count
nouns, causes them to generalize what they know about naming rigid
things to the naming of deformable things. By this explanation, it is the
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co-occurrence of count noun syntax in the naming of both rigid and
deformable things in the vocabulary, and not the use of count noun syntax
in the experiment, that causes three-year-old children to name deformable
things by shape. Thus, this explanation further predicts that three-year-old
children should still attend to shape when naming deformable stimuli
even if a different syntactic frame is used in the experiment. In contrast,
the proposal that the use of a count noun syntactic frame automatically
directs attention to shape predicts that switching the syntactic frame should
eliminate the bias to attend to shape with deformable stimuli. We tested
these competing predictions in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-four three-year-old children (range=2;11.20 to 3;2.21, M=
3;0.19) were recruited as in Experiment 1. All children were from
middle-class, English-speaking families. There were 11males and 13 females.
Data from 3 additional three-year-old children were excluded from the
analyses: 1 due to experimenter error, 1 due to parental interference
and 1 because he did not finish the task. In addition, data from 2 other
children were not included in the analyses because the children did not
meet the conservative criteria for understanding the task set by Samuelson
& Smith (2000). Informed consent was obtained from the children’s
parent or guardian prior to the experimental session. Each child received a
small gift for participating. None of the children had participated in
Experiment 1.
Stimuli, design and procedure
The stimuli and novel names were identical to those used in Experiment 1
(see Figure 1). The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1,
except that the experimenter used a mass noun syntactic frame instead of
count noun syntactic frame when introducing the objects and prompting the
child. For example, ‘Edward is a very picky bear. He only likes kiv. This is
some kiv, and you know what? It squishes. ’ Then, the experimenter told
the child they were going to find ‘more kiv for Edward’. Before presenting
each test object, the experimenter reminded the child of the exemplar’s
property. We used the same inclusion criteria as in Experiment 1. All
children responded correctly to four training trials. Data from one child was
omitted from the analysis for failure to say ‘no’ to at least one test object
across the experimental trials.
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RESULTS
The mean proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched the
exemplar in shape, color or material following demonstrations of related
and arbitrary properties are presented in Figure 3. These data were ana-
lyzed in a rigidity (2)rtest object (3)rrelatedness (2) repeated measures
ANOVA. This analysis yielded a main effect of test object (F(2, 46)=50.82,
p<0.001, g2=0.719). There were no other significant main effects or
interactions.
As can be seen in Figure 3, overall children said ‘yes’ to test objects
that matched the exemplar in shape most often, regardless of whether the
exemplar was rigid or deformable and regardless of the kind of property
demonstrated. Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that the proportion of ‘yes’
responses to test objects that matched the exemplar in shape was significantly
higher than the proportions for either material-matching or color-matching
test objects. Further, three-year-old children said ‘yes’ to test objects that
matched the exemplar in shape more than would be expected by chance
(t(95)=4.15, p<0.001). Thus, three-year-old children demonstrated a
shape bias when naming both rigid and deformable exemplars, even in the
context of a mass noun syntactic frame.
Discussion
When presented with a novel deformable object and a novel name in a mass
noun syntactic frame, three-year-old children generalized the novel name
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Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 2. Proportion of ‘yes’ responses to test objects that matched
the exemplar on shape, color or material for deformable and rigid exemplars following
demonstrations of related or arbitrary properties for three-year-old children. Bars represent
standard errors. Proportions of ‘yes’ responses significantly different from chance levels
(0.50, dashed line) are indicated by an *. Lines indicate cells collapsed for analyses against
chance (see text). Mass noun syntax was used to introduce the novel names in this
experiment.
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to other same-shaped objects – even when the exemplar was deformable.
Overall the results of this experiment are remarkably consistent with
those of Experiment 1, as well as those of Samuelson & Smith (2000),
and strongly suggest that the attention to shape seen previously in
three-year-old children was not due to the use of a count noun syntactic
frame. Thus, these results, in conjunction with the finding in Experiment 1
of a curvilinear trend in the naming of deformables, support the proposal
that three-year-old children overgeneralize a shape bias to the naming of
deformable things.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this research was to elucidate the processes that support young
children’s noun generalizations by examining children’s tendency to name
deformable things by shape similarity. Deformables present an interesting
test case for attention to shape because both shape and material are
important to their category organization. In our first experiment, we
replicated Samuelson & Smith’s (2000) finding of attention to shape when
three-year-old children name deformable stimuli. We also found that
two- and four-year-old children did not generalize novel names for
deformable things by similarity in shape. In Experiment 2, we found that
three-year-old children still generalized names for deformable stimuli by
shape in the context of mass noun syntax. Taken together, this pattern of
results is consistent with Samuelson & Smith’s (2000) proposal that
three-year-old children’s performance when naming deformables is specific
to this age group and reflects an overgeneralization of what they know
about how rigid things are named. The current data have implications for
the processes that support children’s noun generalizations. Further, the
differences in the performance of two-, three- and four-year-old children
suggest a developmental process and inform our understanding of how
the task, stimuli, syntax and knowledge of how nominal categories are
organized in English all come together in a moment in time to create
children’s name generalizations. The following provides a sketch of this
developmental process and shows how it fits with a number of results in the
literature. We focus specifically on how young children’s noun general-
izations change from two to four years of age (see Gathercole & Whitfield,
2001, for related ideas extending to nine years of age).
Overgeneralization
Samuelson & Smith (2000) proposed that three-year-old children over-
generalize what they know about the naming of rigid things to the naming
of deformables because many of the deformable things that children learn
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how to name early are like rigid things in that they are both solid and
named by count nouns. Thus, this is an overgeneralization in the sense
that children are applying what they have learned about the dominant
segment of their vocabulary to the naming of novel stimuli for which other
features might be more relevant. Importantly, by this view, the factors that
cause children to overgeneralize word learning biases some of the time
are the same factors that create correct generalizations the rest of the time.
The current data support these previous suggestions regarding a specific
mechanism underlying children’s noun generalizations.
This, in turn, leads to novel testable predictions. In particular, the
overgeneralization idea suggests that the tendency to generalize novel
names by shape should be related to the overall similarity of novel stimuli to
categories named by the dominant segment of the vocabulary. Now that the
current study has established that generalization of names for deformable
things by shape is unique to children around three years of age, future
studies can more directly test the proposed mechanism by asking children
to generalize names for sets of stimuli that form a continuum from solid
and rigid through deformable and malleable to non-solid. If similarity-
based generalization is the correct mechanism, there should be, for instance,
a point in the direction of non-solids at which three-year-old children stop
naming by shape (see Colunga & Smith, in press, for initial data supporting
this prediction). Manipulating the similarity of stimuli on dimensions
other than rigidity (shape, color and texture, for instance) at the same time
would further enable an examination of the relative importance of rigidity
and other object features in name generalization.
Another future step in this program of research will be to test the
proposed link between overgeneralization and vocabulary structure directly.
This will require developing either a measure of the statistical structure
of older children’s vocabularies or a version of the current task that can
be used with younger children. The extensive efforts needed to directly
test the proposed mechanism are warranted by the clear pattern of results
reported here. In particular, the finding that two-year-old children
differentiate between rigid and deformable things in their naming, more
so than three-year-old children, suggests the value of further investigations
with children in this age range to determine which changes in the vocabulary
are critical and how these changes mechanistically influence the on-line
behavior of novel noun generalization.
Developmental differences
Importantly, these insights into the nature of three-year-old children’s
naming tendencies are grounded by the results reported here that directly
compare two-, three- and four-year-old children performing the SAME task
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with the SAME stimuli. This direct comparison reveals that the performance
of three-year-old children seen previously was not typical of all age
groups. In so doing, these data make an important contribution not only by
suggesting a possible mechanism that brings young children’s vocabulary
knowledge to bear on the current naming task, but also by providing
additional support for previous proposals regarding the origin of the shape
bias. According to Smith and colleagues (Samuelson, 2002; Smith et al.,
2002), the general idea is that children’s acquisition of their first nouns is
done slowly, word-by-word, and is based on multiple direct pairings of the
name and instances of the category. In this stage of the process children
are learning how individual nominal categories are organized and named.
However, because many of the nouns in the early productive vocabulary
of children learning English are names for solid objects in categories
organized by similarity in shape (Samuelson & Smith, 1999), these first
nouns teach children how many nominal categories in general are organized.
This knowledge is the basis of word learning biases like the shape bias
that enable children to learn more nouns quickly (Samuelson, 2002; Smith
et al., 2002). In turn, the new nouns children learn strengthen existing
biases and may lead to the creation of new biases – biases to attend to
features other than shape, for example – to the extent that they are sup-
ported by the statistics of the vocabulary (Jones & Smith, 1993; Smith,
2000; Smith & Samuelson, 2006). These new and stronger biases, then,
support the acquisition of even more words (see Samuelson, 2002; Smith
et al., 2002; Smith & Samuelson, 2006). Thus, the pattern of age differences
we found fits with previous findings of a developmental trend in the
strength and context specificity of the shape bias (e.g. Jones et al., 1991;
Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson & Smith, 2005), and provides further
support for the view that children’s tendency to attend to shape when
learning new nouns DEVELOPS (Samuelson, 2002; Smith, 2000).
The developmental differences reported here, and in particular the
differences in the performance of two- and three-year-old children, conflict
with recent data from Diesendruck & Bloom (2003), however. These
researchers found no differences in the strength of the shape bias
demonstrated by two- and three-year-old children. This difference could
be due to differences in the languages being learned (Hebrew vs. English) or
the ages of children in these experiments. In particular, the two-year-old
children in the present experiment were 2;1 on average. This is very close
to the 2;0 children tested in the studies by Jones et al. (1991) and Landau
et al. (1988), and seven months younger than the children in Diesendruck &
Bloom’s study. Given the rapid pace of noun vocabulary development
at this age, it is possible a seven-month age difference could make a large
difference in terms of vocabulary knowledge and, by hypothesis, noun
generalization.
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It is also possible, however, that task differences could account for the
disparity between the current findings and results from Diesendruck &
Bloom (2003). All the stimuli used in Diesendruck & Bloom’s study were
made from rigid materials such as clay, wood and plastic. In the current
study, the critical developmental differences were found with deformable
stimuli made from sponge and a bean-bag. In addition, the current study
used a yes/no procedure whereas Diesendruck & Bloom used a forced-
choice procedure. Recent work with children and a dynamic systems model
confirms that critical differences in the structure of these tasks can lead to
different patterns of noun generalization behavior – even with the exact
same stimuli (Samuelson & Horst, in press; Samuelson, Horst, Dobbertin
& Schutte, 2006; Samuelson, Schutte & Horst, under review). These task
differences thus highlight the importance of using the same procedures and
stimuli across ages to investigate whether the biases children demonstrate
change over development. This is not to say, however, that differences in
the findings of studies that use different stimuli and tasks are unimportant.
On the contrary, we feel such comparisons provide critical information
concerning the processes that support children’s generalizations. The
comparison of the current results to those of Diesendruck & Bloom (2003),
for instance, suggests that children’s noun generalizations are influenced
by more than just the knowledge children bring to the task about how
nominal categories are organized. Rather, it is the on-line realization of
this knowledge in a particular task, with particular stimuli, that creates the
behavior of noun generalization.
One possible concern, however, is that the yes/no task used here was
TOO difficult for the youngest children in the study. The fact that data
from many two-year-old children were excluded for failure to meet our
conservative criteria for understanding the task confirms that this procedure
was hard for this age group. Nevertheless, the follow-up analyses (see the
Appendix) suggest that the results are representative of the performance
of two-year-old children generally, rather than specific to the subset of
children who passed the criteria for inclusion, and that the developmental
patterns do not change when less conservative criteria for inclusion are
used with the younger children.
It is important to note that a critical challenge for two-year-old children
in the yes/no task seems to be generation of discriminative responses. That
is, two-year-old children tend to say ‘yes’ a lot (though, critically not to
everything). This is in contrast to three- and, in particular, four-year-old
children, and raises an important developmental point : while neither two-
or four-year-old children overgeneralized the shape bias with deformable
stimuli, there were critical differences in their performance. Specifically, the
generalizations of four-year-old children, but not two- or three-year-old
children, were influenced by whether the demonstrated property was
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related to a feature of the exemplar or not. With rigid stimuli, the kind of
property demonstrated influenced whether these children showed a bias to
attend to shape. When the demonstrated property was related to shape,
four-year-old children showed a clear and strong shape bias. However,
when the demonstrated property was not related to the shape of the
exemplar, they generalized novel names by shape similarity most often, but
not at levels statistically different from chance. In part, this finding likely
reflects the increased selectivity seen in the four-year-old children, who,
overall, did not say ‘yes’ as often as the other children. The performance of
the four-year-old children likely also reflects the increased specialization
of the biases these children have developed. That is, their greater experience
with objects, names and the link between what an object looks like and what
can be done with it, might mean that they only generalize names by shape
similarity when all aspects of the task context point towards shape. Thus,
these data again suggest the important influence of the task on the specific
biases children demonstrate, and fit with hypothesized trajectory of change
in the development of the shape bias.
Four-year-old children’s generalizations of novel names for de-
formable stimuli are also informative as to the overall developmental
trajectory. With these stimuli four-year-old children’s generalizations were
unsystematic; they did not attend to material significantly more than
they attended to shape when generalizing names for deformable exemplars
following demonstrations related to the material substance of the exemplar.
This result fits with data from Gathercole & Whitfield (2001) suggesting
that children do not systematically attend to material when generalizing
names for deformable things until eight or nine years of age. By Samuelson
& Smith’s (2000) hypothesis, these data, then, suggest that by four years
of age the composition of children’s vocabularies have changed enough to
prevent overgeneralization of the shape bias to the naming of deformable
things, but that these children have not yet learned enough about
deformable things to attend to material when naming them. The current
data clearly fit with this proposal, although the specific mechanism – change
in vocabulary statistics – will need to be explored in future research.
In conclusion, the current studies provide support for the proposal
that three-year-old children learning English generalize novel names for
deformable things according to shape similarity because their previous
knowledge of nominal categories pushes their attention towards shape. The
different patterns of noun generalization seen in the different age groups,
coupled with the influence of the task and stimuli, however, also suggest the
importance of the interaction between the child’s knowledge of nominal
categories and the current naming context. In this way, the current data
fit with prior results from similar studies showing how young children’s
noun generalizations are tuned to the specifics of the task, stimuli and
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language being learned (see Smith & Samuelson, 2006, for a review). Thus,
the current data suggest that the tendency of three-year-old children to
overgeneralize a bias to attend to shape in the naming of deformable
things emerges over the course of development from the very processes that
direct their attention to the most relevant features of objects in so many
everyday naming situations.
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APPENDIX
A number of two-year-old children were tested but their data was not
analyzed either (a) because it was compromised (due to experimenter error,
not finishing the task or failure to respond on a number of trials ; n=11), or
(b) because they failed to meet our conservative criteria for understanding
the task (n=9). To check whether the results from the two-year-old
children included in the main analyses were specific to those children who
met all inclusion criteria, we conducted a second set of analyses comparing
data from children who were included in the main sample to a subset of
eleven children whose data were excluded from the main analysis.
Of the eleven children whose data were compromised (issue (a) above),
we were able to include data from the five children who responded on
greater than 66% of the experimental trials in this secondary analysis. One
question was what to use to fill the empty cells for these children. The goal
of this secondary analysis was to examine whether the performance of
children whose data had been excluded was different from that of children
whose data was included. Thus, we decided to use the mean proportion of
‘yes’ responses across the children in the ‘excluded’ group who did respond
on a particular trial because this method was likely to reinforce differences
between the groups rather than amplify similarity (as using the mean across
all the children would). Of the children who did not pass Samuelson &
Smith’s conservative criteria for understanding the task (issue (b) above),
we included data from the five children who did not pass training, because
these children demonstrated understanding of the task by answering a
number of training trials correctly – just not four trials IN A ROW correctly as
required by Samuelson & Smith. We also included data from one of the
four children who said ‘yes’ on all the experimental trials. We did not
include the others, however, because these children did not demonstrate
any understanding of the task during training, and recent research suggests
two-year-olds demonstrate a ‘yes’ bias when they do not understand yes/no
questions (Fritzley & Lee, 2003).
We compared the performance of the new subset of eleven children to
that of the main sample of two-year-olds via a rigidity (2)rrelatedness
(2)rgroup (2) repeated measures ANOVA with group as the only between-
subjects factor. This analysis revealed no significant main effects or
interactions involving the groups factor. Thus, the performance of children
who contributed to the main sample and this subset who were excluded did
not differ. As a further check of the generalizability of the two-year-old
children’s results, we re-ran the omnibus ANOVA with all three age
groups, including the additional subset of eleven two-year-old children. We
also re-ran the tests of simple effects and t tests on the full set of data
from two-year-old children. These tests revealed the same pattern of results
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reported in the main text. Thus, while the high attrition rate makes it clear
that the yes/no task was difficult for these young children (see the general
discussion) these analyses confirm that the pattern of results observed was
not unique to the subset of two-year-old children included in the main
analysis, but was, instead, typical of two-year-old children’s responses
generally.
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